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POLICE SCIENCE
SCIENTIFIC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES UNDER DUTCH LAW
With Special Consideration of Scientific Lie Detection and Blood Alcohol Tests
P. MEYJES
The author is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Court of Appeals, of The Hague, Netherlands.
Judge Meyjes originally prepared this paper as a report from the Netherlands to the Fifth Inter-
national Congress of ComparativeLaw which was held in Brussels, Belgium, in August of 1958. Since
its original presentation, the author has had the opportunity to revise and expand his original re-
port, and we are privileged to be able to present it this time to our readers.-EDIToR
In Holland, as is true in other continental
European countries, a person suspected of a
criminal offense, may be interrogated by police
officers, by the prosecutor, and by the member of
the court who conducts the preliminary, pre-trial
examination ("juge d'instruction"). Moreover,
the accused may-and practically always will-be
questioned by the court during the trial itself.
The one restriction placed upon all the inter-
rogators, however, is to the effect that no attempt
should be made to obtain a statement other than
in accordance with the "free will" of the person
being interrogated. Also, the law provides that
no one is obligated to answer questions put to
him by the police, prosecutor, or the court. From
1926 to 1937, a rule existed which required that
a suspect be advised by the police or prosecutor,
or the above mentioned member of the court that
he was under no obligation to answer their ques-
tions, but that rule was abolished in 1937. Now,
therefore, no such warning need be given, either
prior to trial, or at the time of trial.
The foregoing rules apply to interrogations.
Although this is not stated in written law, many
lawyers maintain that they should be equally
observed with regard to other practices or pro-
cedures aimed at the physical or mental examina-
tion of suspected persons.
As far as physical examinations are concerned,
there is a considerable amount of uncertainty.
From the few articles in the Code concerning this
subject it may be inferred that in principle any
examination of the suspected person's body is
lawful on condition that the suspicion be a grave
one. The suspect is not obliged to render any
assistance in this examination, but may remain
entirely passive. He must not, however, offer any
resistance, provided that the examination does
not exceed certain limits. Strangely enough it is
nowhere stated what these limits are, although
everybody will admit that they exist. The only
conclusion that could be drawn from this is that
ethical norms must be regarded as decisive.1
Besides, it is maintained by many that a physical
examination must not infringe the physical
integrity of the person examined; but this state-
ment in itself is inexplicit and therefore hardly a
criterion. Naturally, a more than superficial
examination should only be carried out by a doctor.
It is remarkable that, in spite of the vague and
unsatisfactory character of the present legal rules
and laws, in which the privilege against self-in-
crimination is not clearly expressed, no case law
exists on the subject, and there have been prac-
tically no complaints of abusive practices. This
might justify the presumption that the police,
the prosecutor and the judiciary use their powers
modestly and carefully, respecting the principle of
the privilege even though there is a good deal of
uncertainty as to its applicability.
Photographs may be taken of and fingerprints
from any person under arrest. He may also be
compelled to put on certain garments, to either
grow a beard, or have it shaved, to let his hair
grow, or to have it cut.
Although document examination evidence is
generally accepted, no person can be forced to give
I Cf. Jonkheer L.H.K.C. van Asch van Wijck,
Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht, 1935, p. 145.
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a specimen of his handwriting for comparison
purposes.
No rules exist on the subject of examining the
suspected person's mind with a view to collecting
evidence against him on lines that cannot be
regarded as interrogation, such as submitting him
to association tests, deception tests, or projection
tests. From this the conclusion could be drawn
that the use of such methods would be unlawful.
With regard to all methods of scientific exami-
nation affecting a suspected person, the position
of counsel for the defense is of the greatest im-
portance. One of the most outstanding principles
of the Dutch Code is that a suspect need never
be without a counsel for his defense; that he is
always entitled to choose his own counsel; and
that, ex-officio, legal aid is placed at his disposal
when remand in custody is ordered.2 In case of
imprisonment not bearing the character of a
remand in custody, the suspect's request for legal
aid, made during the prefatory stage of the pros-
ecution, must be granted, unless the duration of
the imprisonment will be so short that it will not
interfere with the steps to be taken by the suspect
in the interest of his defence.
If a suspected person is not under any kind of
arrest, and the nature of the suspicion is suffi-
ciently serious to make legal aid advisable, then
a free counsel may be placed at his disposal if his
means do not allow him to pay a counsel's fee. 3
Judgments have been quashed for the reason
that, contrary to the afore-mentioned rules, no
counsel had been placed at the suspect's disposal.4
Counsel for the defense has the right to visit
his client under arrest and to speak to him without
any other persons being present. Correspondence
between counsel and the prisoner is entirely free
and uncontrolled. Exceptions to these rules can
only be made by special order from the court when
it has been proved that counsel has been abusing
his rights.
Normally, counsel may be present at all inter-
rogations and at hearings of witnesses during the
preliminary examination. If an examination, or
I The same rule applies if, in case of appeal, the
suspect has been under remand during the prosecution
in the first instance.
3 The regulation of legal aid-to be found in articles
40-44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure-has been
revised and considerably improved by the Amendment
acts of 1955 and 1958.
4 Court of Appeal Amsterdam, Nov. 1, 1939, Neder-
landse Jurisprudentie 1939 nr. 1008; Court of Appeal
's-Hertogenbosch, Febr. 12, 1951, Nederlandse Juris-
prudentie 1952 nr. 509.
investigation by experts, has been ordered in the
prefatory phase of the proceedings, the suspected
person and his counsel are informed of this order
and of the result, on the understanding that if it
is in the interest of the examination, this informa-
tion may be temporarily withheld.
With the magistrate's permission the suspect
and his counsel may be present at the examina-
tion by experts. They may nominate counter-
experts, and at the trial they may summon such
experts as they think fit, and they have the right
to inspect the documents bearing on the case.
From these rules it should be clear that what-
ever scientific methods are made use of in the
course of the examination, the defense practically
always has at its disposal the means with which
to test evidence given by experts, and if need be,
disprove it.
The character of the criminal trial under Dutch
law, and the Dutch recognition, in principle, of
the privilege against self-incrimination account
sufficiently for the fact that in this country little
interest is shown in lie detecting, and that most
Dutch lawyers are convinced that such practices
are not lawful. Practically nobody contemplates
the introduction of lie detection evidence, and,
apart from a few popular articles in newspapers,
literature devoted to this subject is extremely
scarce.5
There is only one criminal case on record, in
which clearing up uncertainty by means of lie
detection has been actually tried. As this case was
an unusual one, different in many respects from
the forensic use of deception tests as described in
American literature, it might be worth relating.
An inexperienced, and, as became clear in the
course of the proceedings, a rather unbalanced
young policeman had ventured upon a plan to
detect a gang of smugglers and to catch them in
the act of negotiating false American dollars, all
by himself and without even having consulted his
superiors. Actually, he had been present at the
fraudulent transaction, made a feeble attempt to
arrest the smugglers, and had seized the counterfeit
money. Both in preparing his intervention and in
executing it, the young man's actions had been
so unusual and amazing, that lack of experience,
amateurism, and nervousness could hardly have
accounted for his behaviour, and grave suspicions
rS. J. Timmenga, Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht, 1951,
p. 19; Dr. I. Boon, International Criminal Police
Review, 1952, p. 289 and 322, and also other literature




arose that he had been collaborating with one or
two of the smugglers, and that, right from the
beginning, his actual intention had been to act as
their accomplice and to rob the third man in-
volved. Eventually, the policeman was pros-
ecuted, and, after an extensive examination, he was
found guilty of conspiracy and theft, and sentenced
to a year and six months' imprisonment. Im-
mediately after the trial, counsel for the defense,
convinced of the innocence of his client, suggested
a deception test. The court refused to re-open the
case and pronounced its judgment. The prisoner
having appealed against this judgment, the court
of appeal consented to his submitting himself to
a psychological examination, including deception
tests, to be held in the laboratories of Nijmegen
University. The tests were taken by means of a
pathometer, by which records were obtained of
the subject's psychogalvanic skin reflex. 6 Counsel
for the defense and a psychiatrist being present,
a considerable number of questions was repeatedly
put to the subject, relating not to his actions, but
to his motives. It must be pointed out that none
of these questions could be regarded as new, since
the subject had already been examined on all of
them by the court. The operating expert based his
final opinion upon the results of the tests and a
general psychological examination of the subject's
personality. His conclusions were somewhat dis-
appointing to counsel for the defense, as they
amounted to the subject having acted in good
faith until the moment came when he seized the
false notes, and. reprehensible motives having
played their part from then onwards, leaving the
subject in a state of bewilderment, and accounting
for his incomprehensible actions. His answers to
questions relating to the motives of these actions
were declared to be either definite responses, or
answers of a doubtful nature.
A police interrogation held after the subject
had been informed of the results of the tests, led
to a statement in which, for the first time, he
admitted a certain amount of guilt. The statement
gives the impression, however, that he was more
or less repeating what he had been told by the
psychiatrist who supervised the examination.
Three weeks later the court of appeal considered
the case. Both the trial court and the prosecuting
6 Some time after having written this report I
received further information from the psychologist
who took the tests, Mr. Van der Zee, of Eindhoven,
confirming that he applied the Summers-Kubis method
developed at Fordham University, New York.
attorney-general made it very clear that they
declined all responsibility for the previous exami-
nation of the prisoner's personality and the decep-
tion tests. The psychiatrist and the psychologist
who had conducted the examination gave evidence
in the capacity of expert witnesses for the defense.
Eventually the court adjourned the trial, and
ordered a new mental examination by the fore-
most forensic psychiatrist of this country, Pro-
fessor Baan. It was stipulated that Professor Baan
should also give his opinion of the value of the
statement made by the prisoner after his having
been informed of the results of the deception tests.
His report was that hardly any value could be
attached to this statement, that he considered
pathometer tests much less reliable than the
operating expert did, and that it was impossible
to decide whether the subject's suspicious behav-
iour had been due to his neurotic disposition or to
a criminal incentive. The case ended in an acquit-
tal, in June of 1951.7
A year later Professor Baan lectured on this
case to the Union of the Judiciary of the Nether-
lands, on which occasion a demonstration with the
lie-detector that had been used proved more or less
of a failure. It might be surmised that this experi-
ment has contributed to the unpopularity of lie
detecting among the vast majority of Dutch
lawyers.8
About the same time an endeavour was made
to use the results of deception tests as counter-
evidence in a civil trial. In a disputed paternity
case, the court was satisfied by the sworn state-
ment of the mother, and some circumstantial
evidence, that the defendant, the alleged father,
had been having sexual intercourse with her and
consequently gave judgment against him. He then
had himself examined by a psychiatrist and a
psychologist-the same experts incidentally, who
were called into the afore-mentioned criminal
case. In addition to using other investigative
procedures, they conducted pathometer tests.
Their report, submitted to the court of appeal,
expressed the opinion that the man's assurance
that he never had sexual intercourse with the
mother was likely to be true to such an extent
7 No publicity has been given to this case. My thanks
are due to the Attorney General of the Court of Appeal
at Arnheim for having given me his permission to
consult the files.
8 Editor's Note: For a viewpoint to the effect that
the galvanic skin reflex is an unreliable criterion of
deception, whereas blood pressure and respiration
changes are reliable, see Inbau and Reid, Lie Detection
and Criminal Interrogation (3rd ed., 1953) 102.
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that it might be regarded as beyond reasonable
doubt.
In its very carefully worded judgment the Court
of Appeal (The Hague, May 7, 1952, not pub-
lished) ruled that, considering the lack of experi-
ence in this country with these methods, and the
differing opinions of experts, the results of the
tests could not be accepted as evidence, the less
so since they were intended to disprove evidence
already given, and because the tests had been
made on one of the litigants only. (An appeal was
made, by case stated, but it was of no avail). 9
In 1956 discussions were resumed, as the Associa-
tion of Dutch Lawyers had raised the question
"to what extent methods of investigation in
criminal cases affecting the suspect's person-
either mental or physical-should be subject to
limitations". Introductory reports were written
by Professor Feber, member of the Supreme Court,
and by the present author.'0 We both assumed
that lie detection was to be regarded as one of the
methods referred to.
The question was a complicated one, since there
are no specific prohibitions under the present laws
and regulations. However, the uncertainty on this
point now appears to be of little importance,
because after a discussion involving the two pre-
liminary advisers and a dozen prominent lawyers,
a great majority in the assembly expressed the
opinion that methods such as the lie-detector
technique should not be introduced into Dutch
criminal procedure, with or without the suspect's
consent.' And an even greater majority were
opposed to the use of narco analysis in criminal
proceedings, in spite of Professor Feber's eloquent
defense of his point of view that in the future its
application might be contemplated for the purpose
of ascertaining the truth in exceptionally serious
cases in which all other means had failed.12
If the question should arise as to how far the
views of the Association are representative of
O Mr. van der Zee, psychologist at Eindhoven, and
Dr. J. H. G. Bekker, Barrister-at-law, The Hague,
kindly informed me about this case.
10 Handelingen Nederlandse Juristenvereniging, 1956,
I, p. 111 and p. 179. I published a few more details in
Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht, 1957, p. 198.
" About half a year later Professor R61ing, of Gro-
ningen University, expressed his view, in a lecture held
at Utrecht, that the use of lie detection, provided
compulsion of the suspect is strictly avoided, is not
contrary to the Dutch law of criminal procedure. The
same opinion had been defended by Miss Boon, Pro-
fessor Feber, and myself.
'
2 Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht, 1954, p. 164; Hande-
lingen Nederlandse Juristenvereniging, 1956, I, p. 179;
Hi, p. 140.
general legal opinion, it may be pointed out that
although the majority of the members of the
Association are barristers, five University professors
of criminal law support their opinion.
In addition to its opposition to narco analysis
for lie detection purposes, there is a widespread
feeling within the Lawyers' Association that the
use of narco analysis for the purpose of determin-
ing a suspect's mental condition would also be
objectionable. In this connection the following
case, which occurred a few years ago, is worth
mentioning. In the course of the examination
concerning an unsolved murder, a young soldier
on leave forwarded certain information to the
authorities which was considered to be untrust-
worthy by the magistrate conducting the examina-
tion. The judge-advocate however, contemplating
the possibility that the young man himself might
have committed the murder, had him put under
arrest. A mental examination by an army psychia-
trist was ordered. This doctor decided to question
the subject under sub-narcosis. The magistrate
charged with the preliminary hearing of the
murder case was invited to be present at the
experiment. The magistrate himself did not at
this time regard the subject as a suspect, but
only as a "probably unreliable witness". The
psychiatrist, after having explained the nature
of the examination to the subject, administered
the injection of pentothal with his full consent.
The answers given in a sub-narcotic state were
such that there was no doubt left that the subject
had no knowledge of, and certainly did not commit
the murder. He was immediately released. No
publicity has been given to this case, but the
judicial authorities who were informed about it
unanimously disapproved of the practice.
An exceptional case, illustrative of the doubtful
nature of narco analysis as a means of ascertaining
objective truth, happened some years ago. During
the medical treatment of a young girl who was
operated on for appendicitis it was discovered
that she was also pregnant, a fact for which she
could give no explanation, and by which she was
gravely shocked. As she was showing signs of
mental disturbance, the doctors turned to narco-
analysis, other means of investigating her mental
condition having failed. She then revealed, or made
the impression of revealing, repressed knowledge
of certain occurrences which gave rise to serious
suspicions that she had been violated. In the course
of a series of experiments she went more and more
into details, and subsequently the recollection
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of what she now believed had befallen her, returned
to her conscious mind. She then felt greatly re-
lieved. Nevertheless it was eventually proved
beyond all doubt that the girl had never been
violated, but that she had had sexual intercourse
with her full consent.'3
As a rare instance of unlawful proceedings
mention may be made of a case in which an army
officer, examining a court-martial case, questioned
the suspect with the help of a person calling
himself a psychologist who hypnotized the suspect
and in this way elicited a confession. The court-
martial refused to accept this confession as
evidence, and declared such practices to be un-
worthy of this court.
Under article 26 of the Road Traffic Act, driving
a vehicle or a bicycle on a public road under the
influence of drink to such an extent that the driver
cannot be regarded as capable of driving properly,
is a criminal offence ("d6lit"). In these cases blood
tests are taken, and the results are accepted as
evidence by the courts. Though it has never been
explicitly ruled by the Supreme Court14 that a
blood test taken without the consent of the suspect
is illicit, this question has practically no impor-
tance, because some years ago the Minister of
Justice expressed his point of view as being that
such a consent is required. Naturally the practice
of the police is in accordance with the Minister's
ruling.5 The refusal to allow an alcohol-blood test
is not accepted as evidence against a defendant.
3See, for a full description of this case, Dr. A
Poslavsky, Over het gebruik van penthotal in de
psychiatrische kliniek (1953), p. 194.
14 But see judgment of June 5, 1951, published in
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1951 nr. 520.
The opinion that compulsary blood tests should be
regarded as legal has been supported by Professor van
Bemmelen (Leiden University): Nederlands Juristen-
blad, 1956, p. 504; Handelingen Nederlandse Juristen-
vereniging, 1956, II, p. 116, by Professor Pompe
(Utrecht University), Handelingen Nederlandse
Juristenvereniging, 1956, I1, p. 101, and by Professor
R6ling (Groningen University). Their view was
rejected by Professor Jonkers'(Leiden University),
Handelingen Nederlandse Juristenvereniging, 1956,
II, p. 109.
15 As very little attention has been paid to the ques-
tion whether a more or less intoxicated person is
capable of giving his consent to a measure affecting
his person, it is an open question what the position
would be if the person concerned had apparently been
so drunk that his consent ought to have been considered
invalid.
For a much more detailed explanation of the
problems arising from the rule that the results of a
blood test may be used as evidence, I may refer to
Mr. S. J. Timmenga's treatise "Le test sanguin aux
Pays-Bas", published in Revue Internationale de
Droit PWnal, 1955, p. 375, and to a great extent still
up to date.
There can be little doubt that these unwritten
rules should be regarded as deriving from the
privilege against self-incrimination. 16
The introduction of a compulsory blood test,
as now in force in France, Germany, and other
countries, was rejected by a considerable majority
in the Association of Dutch Lawyers.
Strict technical rules on taking blood tests have
been set up by the central forensic laboratory of
the Ministry of Justice. All specimens are examined
there by a specialized staff, on the latest scientific
lines. The director of this laboratory, Professor
Froentjes, is himself a specialist in this field.
Alcometers are not used and are considered
much less reliable than properly conducted blood
tests. For this reason it is thought here that the
reliability of blood tests greatly outweighs objec-
tions to the small infringement of physical integrity
they involve.
[The following comments were made upon the
author's report as originally presented at the
Fifth International Congress of Comparative Law.]
By S. J. Timmenga, Barrister-at-law, Amsterdam
As Mr. Meyjes has already given a summary of
the Dutch legal system in the preceding report,
I will not go further into that aspect of the subject.
However, apart from the regulations in force there
is the problem of what rights should be granted
to the defense if ever the afore-mentioned modem
scientific methods of investigation were put into
practice. This question, I think, must be regarded
as an essential part of the subject under discussion.
Mr Meyjes having thought it desirable that this
aspect of the problem should be elucidated by a
barrister, I will now, at his request, add a few words
to his report. Naturally, this will not be confined
to existing legal rules, but will be a survey of
opinion, as generally held in this country.
The way in which the new methods of investiga-
tion would be used, would entirely depend upon
the reasons for which they could be considered
morally admissible. The same would apply to the
rights of the defense.
16-It is worthy of note that the Supreme Court
(judgment of June 12, 1953, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
1954, nr. 61) decided that in disputed paternity cases
the courts may order experts to establish the blood
groups of the mother, the child and the alleged father.
Naturally there is no compulsion on the persons con-
cerned to have blood samples taken, but a refusal to do
so may or may not lead to their losing their case (cf.
Court of Appeal 's-Hertogenbosch, Nov. 5, 1953,
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1954, nr. 154).
This points to the privilege against self-incrimination
not applying in civil procedure.
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Professor Feber, to whom Mr. Meyjes has
already referred, takes up a very idealistic stand-
point in his preliminary report to the Association
of Dutch Lawyers; his basic view being, that as
society is making more and more efforts to regard
criminals not as its enemies but rather as diseased
persons who should receive treatment, and is
taking pains to further this purpose, a person
suspected of crime should put his trust in the
authorities. He must not isolate himself from the
authorities, but co-operate in order that the process
of recovery may begin as soon as possible, and
that measures may not be wasted on a person
unfit to undergo them. According to this trend
of thought it would be the suspect's ethical duty
to speak out, and he could not make any objection
to an examination with the help of lie detection,
or an interrogation under narcosis.
Professor Langemeijer, Attorney-General of the
Supreme Court, holds an opinion which greatly
resembles that of Professor Graven (Geneva), his
viewpoint being that, when the vital interests of
other citizens are at stake, these must override
the personal interests of a suspect or of a witness.
If, in a case of kidnapping a child, there should
be a possibility of extorting a statement from a
suspect, or from an unwilling witness, by means
of a lie-detector or narcosis, Professor Langemeijer
would regard this infringement of human
personality as justifiable.
Mr. Meyjes, Vice-President of the Court of
Appeal at The Hague, considers that an interroga-
tion under narcosis could never be admissible,
but, in principle, he does not reject lie detection,
as this, in his opinion, does not affect the suspect's
psyche, and only supplies a record of phenomena
which, with sufficient attention, could be observed
in the course of normal questioning.
The first question arising is in what way a
regulation for the use of new methods of examina-
tion could be made to fit in with the rules already
in force. It is obvious that these methods-and
the same applies to blood tests-cannot be re-
conciled with a system of criminal procedure
bearing a fully accusatorial character, i.e. a system
in which the suspect is a litigant with rights equal
to those of the prosecution. If, in spite of this
system being the legal one, the possibility of
making use of the new methods should be con-
sidered necessary, then their being admitted would
have to be provided for specifically and explicitly
by statute. Moreover, prosecuting authorities
applying the new methods should always be under
the obligation to act fairly.
Under an inquisitorial system in which the
suspect is merely an object of examination any
method of examining would have to be considered
lawful, on condition that prosecuting authorities
adhered to standards set by morality and decency.
Whilst examining they must behave properly and
only make use of such means as can be regarded
as morally justified. A system of this nature has
been advocated in this country by Jonkheer van
Asch van Wijck, until recently Attorney General
of the Supreme Court. This may account for his
thesis that blood tests are permissible.
The viewpoints of Mr. Meyjes and of Professor
Pompe, Professor of Criminal Law at Utrecht
University, vary between the two extremes just
alluded to. They take the line that the admissibility
of methods of examination rests on the precepts
of morality. But they also think that these precepts
should be regarded as unwritten law, forming
part of the Dutch legal system, and that the
courts should insist on their being observed. This
would mean that, apart from a police-officer who
proceeded unfairly being liable to disciplinary
measures, the use of evidence obtained in an un-
lawful way would be prohibited. It is my impres-
sion that the Supreme Court, after primarily
having inclined to the doctrine of Jonkheer van
Asch van Wijck, revised its standpoint in 1951, and
is now inclined to take a view congenial to those
of Professor Pompe and Mr. Meyjes.
My own opinion is that the system first men-
tioned is that of Dutch law. I have expounded
my arguments in my previous report written for
the Academy's Congress in Paris in 1954 and
published in Revin Internationale de Droit P nal
(1955, nrs. 3 and 4, p. 375).
The next question is what formalities should
be observed in the course of an examination
wherein use is made of the new methods.
If the system of criminal procedure is an in-
quisitorial one, and also if an interpretation of
the law as elucidated by Professor Pompe, Mr.
Meyjes, and the Supreme Court, must be regarded
as correct, all stress would have to be laid on the
duties of the authorities, and there would hardly
be any question of the rights of the defense. This
is shown by the Supreme Court's decision of 1951
commented on in my previous report. I presume,
however, that, like myself, they would think it
necessary to invest the defense with certain
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rights, more particularly if for instance in connec-
tion with an interrogation, narcosis should be
turned to, even if it were for the sole purpose of
attaining the utmost degree of reliability.
Moreover, it is of the greatest importance to
distinguish between an examination aiming at the
discovery of the truth as to the facts in question,
and an examination concerning the suspect's
mentality. In the Netherlands both the examina-
tion of facts and the examination of the mental
condition of the suspect (intended to establish
his responsibility for his actions or to throw light
on the question as to what kind of punishment
would be advisable) are held before the trial. This
involves the possibility that the expert charged
with the examination of the suspect's mentality
may find himself in an awkward position, as
facts may have come to his knowledge which the
suspect would not of his own will have admitted
to the court. Obviously, here the expert, as a
doctor, is not entitled to mention such facts in
his report. Especially if the object of the examina-
tion were to establish simulation, it might be
very hard for the expert to avoid influencing the
court as to the suspect being guilty or not guilty.
This complication implies that counsel for the
defense cannot be allowed to be present at the
examination, as, if he were, counsel for the prosecu-
tion would have to be admitted too.
From this it will be clear that the use of lie
detection and narcoanalysis in the examination
of a suspect's state of mind would meet with con-
siderable difficulties. This is to be regretted. For
in the treatment of mental disturbances narco-
analysis is a powerful therapeutic means; and it
would be most unfortunate if the above-mentioned
difficulties caused us to renounce this possibility
of efficient treatment and social readjustment of
criminals.
For this reason it would be desirable to divide
the examination into two separate phases, the
first being solely designed to establish the facts.
The court having found the suspect guilty, the
second phase of the examination would be devoted
to the suspect's personality. This second phase
would have a predominantly medical character,
the court hearing expert evidence, and the rights
of counsel for the defense-the suspect's legal
adviser-would be of less importance than in the
first phase. The right to have counter-experts
beard might suffice.
The kind of criminal examination I am pleading
for here would, much more so than the one actually
in force, be in accordance with the law of the
medical profession. A doctor is not entitled to
examine a patient and to treat him without his
consent. This consent is the justification of the
doctor's infringement, if necessary, of his patient's
personal integrity. Under the rules of criminal
law, instead of the offender's consent, the infrac-
tion of the law he has been found guilty of, and
through which he has lost the right of personal
integrity, will justify the infringement. This would
seem preferable to the loss of that right finding
its justification in a mere suspicion.
A rearrangement of criminal proceedings would
also be an improvement with regard to the mental
examination of the suspect as is now customary,
e.g., the examination held in order to establish
the degree in which he is responsible for his actions,
in which examination we already meet with the
difficulties referred to.
If we imagine, as Professor Feber does, a future
legal system in which there would be practically
no antithesis of the community and the individual,
the problem I have been dealing with would not
arise. Criminal procedure would then assimilate
to medical treatment and the compulsion of the
individual to undergo such treatment would
then be justified by social order. The examination
would be held entirely in the interest of the sus-
pected (or sick) person himself, and the confines
of the legal and the medical fields would disappear.
Under such a system the rights of the defense
would be of little importance. However, as long as
there is a struggle between society and the in-
dividual, as there is generally admitted to be,
even by Professor Feber, criminal procedure should
be divided into two phases.
If the new methods are to be made use of in
the first phase, proper safeguards should be
established by statute.
First of all, only the most reliable method
should be applied, and only the use of the most
reliable instruments should be allowed. Examina-
tions by persons not being experts should be
prohibited. Both counsel for the prosecution and
counsel for the defense, as well as the magistrate
charged with the preliminary examination, must
be present. The use of these methods should be
lawful only in the case of grave suspicion of an
offense to be specified by statute. Moreover the
consent of the court should be required, or, in
extremely urgent cases, that of the magistrate
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charged with the preliminary examination, who
would also have to decide on which facts under
examination the test must bear. Counsel for the
defense should always have the right to have a
counter-test taken under the same conditions, by
another expert. The court ought to be under the
obligation to pay due attention to the result of
the counterexamination, the insertion in the
judgment of the reasons why the court is satisfied
by either of the experts' reports being made
compulsory.
Obviously, practices of this nature will produce
considerably higher expenses than presently
incurred. In a small country like the Netherlands,
finding the experts who would have to carry out
the examinations would amount to a problem
that might prove unsolvable. How many would
have the opportunity of gathering sufficient ex-
perience to cope with lie detection? A judicial
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interrogation under narcosis could not be held
by a doctor familiar with this method for medical
purposes but lacking forensic experience.
It is not surprising, therefore, that for practical
reasons Mr. Meyjes came to the conclusion that
for the time being introducing lie detection into
the Netherlands would not be feasible; and even
more so as to narco analysis.
Recapitulating my arguments, I would state
once more that if an acceptable use of the new
methods is desired, a division of criminal procedure
would be indispensable. In the first phase it would
have to be confined to the facts under examina-
tion, and in the second phase the establishment
of the mentality of the suspect would have to be
the issue. Moreover, each method of examination
should be regulated by statute, the powers of the
authorities and the rights of the suspect being
substantially and minutely defined.
